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INTRODUCTION

If there were ever a controversial topic, it is abortion. Indeed,
the constitutionality of laws restricting abortion1 has been the topic
of frequent, fervent debate in the United States. After Roe v. Wade2
and later Planned Parenthood v. Casey,3 much of the dispute over
abortion has focused on the role of government in funding
abortions, 4 related services, 5 and related organizations. 6 Another
frequent topic is the constitutionality of government regulating
abortion or abortion providers, 7 rather than the constitutionality of
outright prohibiting abortion. 8 Moreover, public debate has
considered government involvement in, and regulation of, research
and development related to biotechnology, including reproduction

1 See, e.g., Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1), 117
Stat. 1201, 1201 (2003) ("A moral, medical, and ethical consensus exists that the practice
of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a gruesome and inhumane procedure that
is never medically necessary and should be prohibited.").
2 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (finding a constitutional right "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
3 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (retaining
and reaffirming "the essential holding of Roe v. Wade").
4 See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977) (holding "that Pennsylvania's
refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with
Title XIX" of the Social Security Act); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977) (holding
that the Constitution does not require "a [Medicaid] participating State to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions when it pays for childbirth").
6 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991) (rejecting constitutional
challenges to restrictions on federal funding of abortion counseling).
6 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio v. Hodges, 917 F.3d 908, 910 (6th
Cir. 2019) (upholding restrictions on state funding to organizations performing
nontherapeutic abortions).
7 See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310-11, 2314
(2016) (invalidating as unconstitutional requirements of admitting privileges and nearby
surgical centers placed on abortion providers); EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v.
Beshear, 920 F.3d 421, 446 (6th Cir. 2019) (upholding Kentucky's Ultrasound Informed
Consent Act against First Amendment challenge).
8 That said, recent legislative proposals have sought to prohibit abortion in certain
situations, including the very early weeks of pregnancy. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise,
How Banning Abortion in the Early Weeks of Pregnancy Suddenly Became Mainstream,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/ohio-abortionheartbeat-bill.html [https://perma.cc/X35T-WMVU].
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technologies, and particularly the use and destruction of embryonic
stem cells, embryos, and fetuses. 9
But government funding, regulation, and involvement in
research and development are not the only mechanisms the
government uses to impact the development and use of
controversial technologies, including abortion, biotechnology, and
reproduction technologies. Another such mechanism is the patent
system. The patent system provides an incentive for inventors and
their supporters to invest in research and development of new
technologies.10 To the extent an invention is eligible for patenting,
the inventor may obtain a patent on the invention so long as he or
she satisfies the other patentability and disclosure requirements of
the patent statute.1 1 The invention, for example, must be new1 2 and
non-obvious to one of ordinary skill in the relevant field of
technology.13 And the patent application must disclose the details
of the invention as well as how to make and use it.14 If the invention
9 This debate played out publicly in national politics during the administration of
George W. Bush. See 0. Carter Snead, Public Bioethics and the Bush Presidency, 32
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 867, 875 (2009) ("The moral, legal, and public policy dispute
over embryonic stem cell research (and related matters, such as human cloning) is the
most prominent issue in public bioethics of the past decade. Since the derivation of
human embryonic stem cells in 1998 at the University of Wisconsin, the issue has been
debated and discussed by scholars, politicians, members of the popular media, and the
public at large. It has been a recurring issue in political campaigns and the activities of
the political branches of government at the state and federal level. Without question, it
is the defining issue for President Bush's contribution to public bioethics.").
10 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) ("[T]he patent system
represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly
for a limited period of time.").
1 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2020) ('Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.").
12 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2020) (describing the novelty requirement).
13 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2020) ("A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained,
notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in
section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such
that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the
claimed invention pertains.").
14 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2020) ('The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth
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and the patent application meet all these requirements, a patent
issues to the inventor granting him or her a right to exclude others
from using the patented invention 15 and a right to collect money
damages from those who infringe the right to exclude. 16 These
rights can be valuable. Thus, patents can provide monetary
rewards to those who engage in research and develop inventions,
and the possibility of obtaining these monetary rewards induces
some inventors to engage in research and development. 17 The
chance of obtaining these monetary rewards likewise induces
investors to support inventors in these efforts.
While the patent system impacts the development and use of
technologies, only to a limited extent have legislators recognized
the moral and ethical implications of the patentability of
controversial technologies like abortion, biotechnology, and
reproduction technologies. Congress and the President have
enacted legislation stating that, "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism." 18 That's it. Other than this one
example, the question of the patentability of technologies some
deem immoral or unethical has not even been the subject of
legislative debate. Indeed, the absence of debate related to the
patentability of controversial technologies is not limited to abortion,
the best mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the
invention.").
15 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2020) ("Every patent shall contain ...
a grant to the
patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention
into the United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude others
from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United States, or importing into
the United States, products made by that process, referring to the specification for the
particulars thereof."); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2020) ("Except as otherwise provided in this
title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
16 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2020) ('Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the
claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together
with interest and costs as fixed by the court.").
17 Andrew Blair-Stanek, Profits as Commercial Success, 117 YALE L.J. 642, 650
(2008) ('The classical economic theory of patents sees them as a mechanism for inducing
inventive activity and disclosure by providing the reward of monopoly protection.").
18 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
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biotechnology, and reproduction technologies. There also has not
been debate regarding patentability with respect to other areas of
concern, such as technologies that damage the environment.
I find this absence of legislative debate regarding the
patentability of controversial technologies curious for at least four
reasons. First, the judicial branch, as opposed to the political
branches of the federal government that enact legislation, for
nearly two centuries-until 1999-held that immoral or unethical
technologies were not eligible for patenting. 19 Second, other nations'
patent statutes and the European Patent Convention explicitly
identify morality as a basis for denying an applicant a patent.2 0
Third, as I have already described, for decades there has been an
intense public debate in the United States over the government's
involvement in, and regulation of, research and development
related to abortion, biotechnology, and reproduction technologies,
and particularly the use and destruction of embryonic stem cells,
embryos, and fetuses-areas of considerable moral and ethical
concern. And, fourth, Congress is currently considering proposals
to amend the patent statute to change the law of patent
eligibility 21-and no one has recognized that these proposals would

Compare, e.g., Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No.
8,568) (Story, J.) ("All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous
or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society. The word 'useful,
therefore, is incorporated into the act in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral.
For instance, a new invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate
private assassination, is not a patentable invention.") with Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("Of course, Congress is free to declare
particular types of inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including
deceptiveness. . . . Until such time as Congress does so, however, we find no basis in
section 101 to hold that inventions can be ruled unpatentable for lack of utility simply
because they have the capacity to fool some members of the public.").
20 See, e.g., Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent
Convention) art. 53(a), Oct. 5, 1973 (amended Nov. 29, 2000), https://www.epo.org/lawpractice/legal-texts/html/epc/2016/e/ma1.html
[https://perma.cc/NR92-A27P]
('European patents shall not be granted in respect of ...
inventions the commercial
exploitation of which would be contrary to 'ordre public' or morality; such exploitation
shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely because it is prohibited by law or regulation
in some or all of the Contracting States.").
21 Press Release, U.S. Senator Christopher Coons, Sens. Coons and Tillis and Reps.
Collins, Johnson, and Stivers Release Section 101 Patent Reform Framework (Apr. 17,
2019), https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/sens-coons-and-tillis-and-repscollins-johnson-and-stivers-release-section- 101-patent-reform-framework [https://perm
a.cc/WKL5-YNA3] (announcing a "bipartisan, bicameral framework on Section 101
19
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overturn the existing prohibition on obtaining a patent with "a
claim directed to or encompassing a human organism." 22
In this Article I explore the patentability of controversial
technologies by identifying and analyzing the strengths and
weaknesses of the argument that immoral or unethical technologies
should not be patentable. Toward that end, I trace the history of the
patent system's treatment of technologies deemed immoral or
unethical, consider the arguments that moral and ethical
considerations should cause the law to exclude technologies from
the patent system, and identify the best approach should moral and
ethical considerations be reintroduced into the patentability
analysis. As part of this analysis, I explore several factors that
might be relied upon to limit the patent eligibility of immoral or
unethical inventions. I then analyze whether judicial, legislative, or
agency control over moral and ethical concerns makes the most
sense in this context. Surprisingly, despite clear parallels between
the use of public policy arguments in contract law and patent law,
my analysis presents the first attempt to conceptualize moral and
ethical concerns in the patent field by considering the strengths and
weaknesses of the traditional contract defense of unenforceability
as against public policy.
In short, drawing upon critical analyses of contract law's
public policy doctrine, I suggest that any moral or ethical concerns
with patenting should be governed by express limitations on patent
eligibility introduced through the political process, or, in other
words, through legislation enacted by Congress and the President,
rather than through judicial or agency processes. In this way, this
Article contributes to the ongoing debate over patent eligibility, not
only by reintroducing into the debate the important but overlooked
possibility of ending the encouragement or rewarding of immoral or
unethical activity, but also by presenting a novel analysis of the
best approach to addressing these concerns.
Part I begins by addressing the legal landscape. Part I.A.
considers the historical treatment of immoral and unethical
inventions under patent law, while Part I.B. explains their modern
patent reform" that would "[d]efine, in a closed list, exclusive categories of statutory
subject matter which alone should not be eligible for patent protection").
22 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
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treatment. Part I.C. then highlights how current patent reform
efforts would undermine the limited exception current law provides
for patent claims encompassing human organisms. Part II, in turn,
catalogs moral and ethical arguments relevant to the patentability
of these technologies. Part II.A., for example, discusses whether
personal autonomy ought to play a role in the determination of
patentability. Part II.B. then analyzes the eligibility of immoral or
unethical technologies from the countervailing standpoint of
utilitarian and fairness concerns. Given this legal landscape and
the consideration of prominent arguments for and against limiting
patentability based on moral and ethical concerns, Part III
reintroducing
mechanisms
for
evaluates
the
relevant
considerations of morality and ethics into the consideration of
patent law. As mentioned, in a novel assessment drawing upon
criticisms of contract law's public policy doctrine, I conclude that
any moral or ethical concerns with patenting should be governed by
limitations on patent eligibility expressed in the patent statute,
rather than through ad hoc judicial or agency determination.
I.

THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Here I set the stage for later discussion by considering patent
law's historical treatment of immoral and unethical inventions
before explaining patent law's modern treatment of these
inventions.

A. Historical Treatment of Immoral and UnethicalInventions
Historically, patent examiners and judges had great discretion
respectively to refuse to issue patents and to invalidate patents on
inventions they deemed immoral or unethical. They did so by using
patent law's usefulness requirement.
Patent law's usefulness requirement has constitutional and
statutory underpinnings. The Constitution, for example, grants
Congress the power to "[t]o promote the Progress of . . useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right
to their . . . Discoveries." 23 The patent statute, likewise, has-since
the first Patent Act in 1790-stated that patents may be granted

23

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
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for "any useful" invention. 24 Indeed, the Patent Act of 1790 stated
that the original patent examiners (the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, and the Attorney General) were required to
determine whether the invention was "sufficiently useful" for a
patent to issue. 25
Judges, for their part, long understood this usefulness
requirement as having moral and ethical elements. In 1817, for
example, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, while "circuit
riding" 26 instructed a jury regarding what a patentee must prove to
obtain a verdict of patent infringement. 27 "He must, in the first
place," Justice Story explained, "establish [his machine] to be a
useful invention." 28 In this regard, he explained:
All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals
of society. The word "useful," therefore, is incorporated into the act
in contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance, a new
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate
private assassination, is not a patentable invention. 29
In this short explanation, Justice Story set forth his
understanding, complete with examples, that the "usefulness"
requirement prohibited patents on inventions "injurious to the wellbeing . . . or sound morals of society" or, in other words, inventions
"mischievous or immoral." 3 0 In another instance of circuit riding the
very same year, Justice Story articulated a similar understanding
of the usefulness requirement. 31 That said, the discussion in both
§

24

See Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7,

25

Id.
See generally Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of

26

1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790) (emphasis added).

Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZo L. REV. 1753, 1753-55 (2003) (describing "circuit riding" as
the "system of sending Supreme Court Justices around the country to serve as judges of
the various federal circuit courts" and analyzing its history).
27 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019-21 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (Story,
J.).
28 Id. at 1019.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See Bedford v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37, 37 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 1,217) (Story, J.)
('By useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to some
beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention, which is injurious to the
morals, the health, or the good order of society. It is not necessary to establish, that the
invention is of such general utility, as to supersede all other inventions now in practice
to accomplish the same purpose. It is sufficient, that it has no obnoxious or mischievous
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cases represented mere dicta, because in the first there was "no
pretence" that the inventor's invention was "mischievous"32 and in
the second similarly "there [could not] be the slightest doubt, upon
the evidence, that the patent is for a useful invention, in a very
large sense."3 3 Moreover, because Justice Story was circuit riding,
his opinions did not have the precedential value of a Supreme Court
opinion.
Judges over the next almost 175 years nevertheless applied
Justice Story's understanding of the usefulness requirement, many
to deny patents on inventions they deemed unethical or immoral.
In 1820, just three years after Justice Story, another Supreme
Court Justice circuit riding, Bushrod Washington, cited Justice
Story's understanding of the usefulness requirement. 34 Justice
Washington, however, like Justice Story, found the requirement
met. 35 Later other judges would not.
In 1889, 1897, and 1922, for example, judges invalidated
patents on gambling or lottery devices. 36 As one of these judges

tendency, that it may be applied to practical uses, and that so far as it is applied, it is
salutary. If its practical utility be very limited, it will follow, that it will be of little or no
profit to the inventor; and if it be trifling, it will sink into utter neglect. The law, however,
does not look to the degree of utility; it simply requires, that it shall be capable of use,
and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance or prohibit.").
32 Lowell, 15 F. Cas. at 1019.
33 Bedford, 3 F. Cas. at 37.
34 Kneass v. Schuylkill Bank, 14 F. Cas. 746, 748 (C.C.D. Pa. 1820) (No. 7,875)
(Washington, J.) ("[I]t is always difficult to prove the entire worthlessness of any
discovery, or of any article susceptible of use. If the plaintiffs invention correspond
substantially with the thing used by the defendants, how can the latter be permitted to
say, that the thing so discovered and used is worthless? In the case of Lowell v. Lewis
[Case No. 8,568], Mr. Justice Story, commenting upon this subject, lays it down, that the
law only requires that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well being,
good policy, and sound morals of society.").
31 Id. ('Now can it be urged that this definition is at all applicable to the plaintiffs
invention? Let this question be answered by the witnesses in this cause. Those for the
plaintiff agree that the invention is a security against the counterfeiting of the notes,
and even Mr. Wilson, the witness most relied upon by the defendants, concurs in the
same opinion, where the middle part of the plate is used, as it appears to have been by
the defendants.").
B6 See Nat'l Automatic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89, 90 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889) ('The law
of the United States only authorizes the issue of a patent for a new and useful invention,
and in an early case on that subject (Bedford v. Hunt, 1 Mason, 302) it was held that the
word 'useful,' as used in this statute, means such an invention as may be applied to some
beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention which is injurious to the
morals, health, or good order of society, and the principle thus enunciated has been
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explained, "the only use to which the invention has been put being
for gambling purposes, I must hold that it is not a useful device,
within the meaning of the patent law, as its use so far has been only
pernicious and hurtful." 37 Another of these judges invalidated a
patent as lacking usefulness given that "the apparatus is used for
gambling purposes, and that it cannot be used for any other
purpose." 38 The third likewise invalidated a patent because "[n]o
other utility than as a lottery device (in promoting sales or for
similar uses) is suggested in the patent; and the claims themselves
exclude any combination in which the element of the concealing
means has no useful function."3 9
Other judges during the same time period took aim at other
inventions focusing on deception. In 1900, for example, the Second
Circuit affirmed the invalidation of a patent because the claimed
invention "confer[red] no other benefit upon the public than the
uniformly applied ever since. It is urged that this machine is susceptible of being utilized
as a toy, or child's plaything; but it is a sufficient answer to this suggestion that no such
use has been as yet made. The patent has been very recently issued, and it is possible
that a useful application may yet be found for it; but as the case now stands, the only use
to which the invention has been put being for gambling purposes, I must hold that it is
not a useful device, within the meaning of the patent law, as its use so far has been only
pernicious and hurtful."); Schultze v. Holtz, 82 F. 448, 449 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) ("[T]he
verified answer not only denies that the invention is new and useful, but alleges a specific
fact, which, if true, disposes of the question of utility. It charges directly that the
apparatus is used for gambling purposes, and that it cannot be used for any other
purpose. Clearly, this is an allegation which, under the rule, should be treated as
testimony in favor of the defendants, and, in view of the fact that the complainant has
introduced no testimony to support the patent, it is, in my judgment, sufficient to entitle
the defendants to a decree in their favor. The same conclusion would probably be reached
in looking at the claims and specifications of the patent upon the allegations of the
answer treated as merely raising the issue of utility."); Brewer v. Lichtenstein, 278 F.
512, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1922) ("In appellant's patent, as the specification and claims clearly
disclose, the utility of the limitation of the covering element to a concealing means was
to enable the gambling instinct of purchasers to be appealed to in promoting the sale of
merchandise. No other utility than as a lottery device (in promoting sales or for similar
uses) is suggested in the patent; and the claims themselves exclude any combination in
which the element of the concealing means has no useful function. . . . At the oral
argument appellant asserted, correctly enough, that not all drawings of lots are illegal,
and suggested the case of two candidates who are directed by law to resolve a tie by
drawing lots and also the case of the government's determining by lot the order in which
eligible conscripts should go to war. But those instances seem to us to be beyond the
range of any practical utility with which the patent law is concerned.").
" Nat'l Automatic Device Co., 40 F. at 90.
38 Schultze, 82 F. at 449.
39 Brewer, 278 F. at 513.
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opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud." 40 The patent in
question disclosed treating tobacco leaves to cause them to appear
as if they were spotted by natural causes. 4 1 The court described this
treatment as creating a "counterfeit" given that, unlike naturallyspotted leaves, the treated leaves did not "promote the burning
quality of the leaf' or otherwise "improve its quality in any
respect." 42 According to the court, this treatment was therefore not
"beneficial" but instead "pernicious." 43
Likewise in 1925 the Second Circuit similarly faulted another
inventor for "decorat[ing] an old article of manufacture, or
dress[ing] it to present an appearance to the eye that is not original
as such," because "he does not change or improve the structure or
the utility of the article." 44 This invention "relate[d] to a circular
knit or seamless stocking" that imitated "some of the characteristic
appearances of the straight or old-fashioned and seamed
stockings." 45 The court admitted that through this imitation the
invention "wins popularity and makes the [new] article more
salable." 46 "But," concluded the court, "such accomplishment does
not create a new useful discovery or invention." 47

40 Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 869, 873 (2d Cir. 1900) ("We are of the opinion that
neither the treatment applied by the defendant, nor that described or advised in the
patent, has any tendency to promote the burning quality of the leaf, or to improve its
quality in any respect, and that the only effect, if not the only object, of such treatment,
is to spot the tobacco, and counterfeit the leaf spotted by natural causes. . . . In
authorizing patents to the authors of new and useful discoveries and inventions, congress
did not intend to extend protection to those which confer no other benefit upon the public
than the opportunity of profiting by deception and fraud. To warrant a patent, the
invention must be useful; that is, capable of some beneficial use as distinguished from a
pernicious use.").
41 Id. at 869.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 873.
44 Scott & Williams, Inc. v. Aristo Hosiery Co., 7 F.2d 1003, 1004 (2d Cir. 1925) ("In
this accomplishment, the inventor decorates an old article of manufacture, or dresses it
to present an appearance to the eye that is not original as such; but he does not change
or improve the structure or the utility of the article. The appearance is imitation, and
thus, through it, wins popularity and makes the article more salable. . . . But such
accomplishment does not create a new useful discovery or invention, and it was not the
intention of Congress to grant protection to those who confer no other benefit to the
public than an opportunity for making the article more salable.").
45 Id. at 1003.
46 fId at 1004.
47

Id.
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Devices that lack operability have also been deemed deceptive
or even fraudulent and therefore not patentable. In 1960, Judge
Giles Rich described much of the history of the usefulness
requirement. 48 As relevant here, he connected the idea of lack of
operability with fraud. He did so by citing the 1940 decision of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Oberweger.49 In that
case, the court affirmed the Patent Office's rejection of an
application seeking a patent on an alleged invention for "treating
the scalp for the purpose of producing hair growth." 50 The Patent
Office had determined that affidavits "were not sufficient to show
utility for a concoction which belongs to a class of compositions
which from common knowledge has long been the subject matter of
much humbuggery and fraud." 5 1 In affirming, the court explained
that:
It is a matter of common knowledge that numerous
preparations, similar in many respects to the one at bar, have
been advertised and sold for the purpose of producing hair on
bald heads and which were totally lacking in utility, often
harmful to the human body, and whose sale was generally
understood to be a fraud upon the public. 52
Other judges, however, during this same time period limited
or rejected the approach of using patent law to address moral and
ethical concerns. Some judges, for example, distinguished certain
inventions from others found to be unpatentable based on the
usefulness requirement. One case involved a patent on a
48 In re Nelson, 280 F.2d 172, 178-80 (C.C.P.A. 1960) (Rich, J.) (collecting treatises
and cases addressing utility).
49 Id. at 180 (citing In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826 (C.C.P.A 1940)).
50 Oberweger, 115 F.2d at 826.
51 Id. at 828.
52 Id. at 829. A more modern example is the current uproar over the Theranos
patents, which are viewed as deceptive or fraudulent because they disclose ideas that do
not work. Krista L. Cox, Elizabeth Holmes and the Great Patent Scam, ABOVE THE LAW
(Mar. 7, 2019, 1:18 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/03/elizabeth-holmes-and-thegreat-patent-scam/ [https://perma.cc/2PLM-TQX5] ('Holmes was granted a patent for an
idea, but not one that could actually be practiced.... Theranos is the clear example of
what could and did go wrong, with fake patents-well, they were grantedpatents, so real
from that perspective, but fake in the sense that the things they protected didn't actually
exist-propping the company up, lending Holmes credibility that led to harm to who
knows how many investors and hundreds of employees who were ultimately laid off in
the wake of the scandal. With patents in hand, Holmes built a fraudulent company.").
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shuffleboard game. 53 According to the Third Circuit, "[b]ecause of
the cultural and prophylactic importance of games in our social
structure, and the additional relevant factor of the huge annual
expenditure for recreation we can properly conclude that the
creation of a new game conforms to the patent requirement of being
useful." 54 Thus, the court distinguished games from things
"frivilous [sic] or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society," finding the former useful even if the latter were
not. 55 The Seventh Circuit similarly distinguished pin-ball
machines from gambling devices. 56
Other judges sought to limit the invalidity theory of lack of
usefulness to inventions incapable of any beneficial use. Thus,
patents on inventions useful only in gambling or lottery devices
would be invalid, but patents on inventions having any usefulness
outside of gambling or lotteries would not be invalid. For example,
the Seventh Circuit confronted a patent on "a bogus-coin detector
for coin-operated vending machines." 57 While "the only practical use
to which the detectors were put was to guard gambling machines,
made and controlled by the company, from being operated by means
of a bogus coins," 58 the court nevertheless held that a patent
covering the detectors met the usefulness requirement because
"[t]he testimony of experts was not needed to show that the detector
would perform its functions without regard to the character of the
machine below its outlet." 59 According to the court, this invention

Cusano v. Kotler, 159 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1947).
at 162.
(quoting Lowellv. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)
(Story, J.)).
56 Chicago Patent Corp. v. Genco, Inc., 124 F.2d 725, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1941)
('Defendant contends that the device of the patent is inherently a gambling machine
without utility and, therefore, beyond protection by the patent laws... . Here the trial
court made a specific finding that skill in operating the device is not wholly absent, that
the machine may be operated 'without gain being a factor' and that the court could not
conclude as a matter of law that it is incapable of legitimate use. .. . Bearing in mind
that issuance of the patent creates a prima facie presumption of utility ... the absence
of any showing by defendant to overcome such presumption and the finding of the trial
court, it is apparent that we can not say as a matter of law that the combination of the
patent is inherently a gambling device.").
7 Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 274 (7th Cir. 1903).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 277.
53

54 Id.
55 Id.
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was, in relevant part, like the invention of Colt's revolver.6 0 On the
one hand it "was injurious to the morals, and injurious to the
health, and injurious to the good order of society," 61 but "[o]n the
other hand, the revolver, by furnishing a ready means of selfdefense, may sometimes have promoted morals and health and good
order." 62 According to the court, "everything [is] useful within the
meaning of the law, if it is used (or is designed and adapted to be
used) to accomplish a good result, though in fact it is oftener used
(or is as well or even better adapted to be used) to accomplish a bad
one[.]"63 This approach substantially limited the ability of the
usefulness requirement to invalidate patent claims based on moral
or ethical concerns.
Another similar approach that limited the ability of the
usefulness requirement to invalidate patent claims based on moral
or ethical concerns was to look for a minimal level of usefulness.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals used this approach in
the context of pharmaceutical inventions alleged to fail the
usefulness requirement because of a lack of safety with regard to
their use. Consider first In re Anthony. 64 In this case the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals recognized that "courts over the years
have considered 'safety' as an aspect of the broader question of
whether certain inventions-pharmaceuticals in particular-are
'useful' within the meaning of § 101 and its predecessors." 65 While
"a composition unsafe for use by reason of extreme toxicity to the
point of immediate death under all conditions of its sole
contemplated use in treating disease of the human organism" would
not meet the usefulness requirement, "'safety' is a relative matter,
and . . . absolute proof of complete safety is realistically

60

Id. at 275.

61

Id.
Id.
Id.

62
63

(quoting WALKER ON PATENTS, 3d ed.,
(quoting WALKER ON PATENTS, 3d ed.,
(quoting WALKER ON PATENTS, 3d ed.,

§ 82).
§ 82).
§ 82).

64 See generally In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
65 Id. at 1394 ("Although the patent statutes do not establish 'safety' as a criterion

for patentability of any of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter mentioned
in § 101, yet it is undoubtedly true, as demonstrated by some of the cases cited by the
examiner, that the Patent Office and the courts over the years have considered 'safety'
as an aspect of the broader question of whether certain inventions-pharmaceuticals in
particular-are 'useful' within the meaning of § 101 and its predecessors.")
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impossible." 66 Given that the "evidence of record incontrovertibly
[sic] establishe[d] that appellant's compositions [we]re effective in
treating various types of mental depressions in humans,"6 7 the
court in this case reversed the Patent Office's rejection for lack of
usefulness-even in the face of an admission that conditions of use
disclosed in a New Drug Application to the Food and Drug
Administration caused the patented drug to be "unsafe for use to a
degree justifying its withdrawal from the market."68 Likewise, in
the later case of In re Watson, 69 the court concluded that another
pharmaceutical invention met the usefulness requirement because
"at least over a short period of use, [the claimed invention] meets

66 Id. ("No one, we suppose, would seriously maintain that, as a matter of policy, a
composition unsafe for use by reason of extreme toxicity to the point of immediate death
under all conditions of its sole contemplated use in treating disease of the human
organism would nevertheless be useful within the meaning of the patent laws. But at
the same time it must be recognized that 'safety' is a relative matter, and that absolute
proof of complete safety is realistically impossible.")
67 Id. at 1397 ("The evidence of record incontrovertably [sic] establishes that
appellant's compositions are effective in treating various types of mental depressions in
humans.").
68 Id. at 1398-99 ("[I]t is no doubt true that an unequivocal finding by the FDA that
a drug is totally unsafe in all circumstances of contemplated use should not be lightly
regarded by the Patent Office as an aid in its determination of whether a drug is useful
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. But what has the FDA found here? In concluding that the FDA
has ruled 'Monase' to be 'unsafe,' without further qualification, we think the board has
painted with too broad a brush, and has drawn inferences from the Suspension Order
that are not justified by its specific language. The order does not contain any broad,
pervasive finding, nor has Upjohn in any way 'admitted,' that 'Monase' is completely and
absolutely unsafe under all conditions of use, i.e., that 'Monase' is medically 'useless.'
What it does say, and what we understand appellant to concede here, is that under the
conditions of use upon the basis of which the application became 'effective,' 'Monase' is
unsafe for use to a degree justifying its withdrawal from the market and suspension of
the effectiveness of the New Drug Application.").
69 In re Watson, 517 F.2d 465, 476 (C.C.P.A. 1975) ("As this court stated in Anthony,
safety' is a relative matter, absolute proof of safety is realistically impossible, and in the
safety of pharmaceuticals Congress has given primary administrative jurisdiction to
federal agencies other than the PTO. Assuming (as the solicitor contends) the Food and
Drug Administration order determines that hexachlorophene is not suitable for use on
mucous membrane, and assuming this is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie
case for lack of safety under § 101 (viz, that a mouthwash containing hexachlorophene
is unsafe by reason of hexachlorophene being associated with toxic effects sufficient to
require that continued marketing of hexachlorophene-containing products be carefully
defined in order to protect consumers), nevertheless the Pader affidavit demonstrates,
at least over a short period of use, that a mouthwash containing hexachlorophene, as in
claim 5, meets the minimum level of safety needed to satisfy § 101.").
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the minimum level of safety needed to satisfy § 101."70 In both
cases, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals seemed comforted
by the idea that "in the safety of pharmaceuticals Congress has
given primary administrative jurisdiction to federal agencies other
than the PTO."71
Eventually, in 1977, the Patent Office went even further than
any of these judges in limiting the inquiry into morality and ethics.
In a decision of the Board of Appeals, the Patent Office rejected
wholesale any inquiry into morality or ethics, regardless of whether
the invention in question was useful only, for example, for
gambling: "while some may consider gambling to be injurious to the
public morals and the good order of society, we cannot find any basis
in 35 U.S.C. [§] 101 or related sections which justify a conclusion
that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are
void of patentable utility." 72 This decision set the stage for courts'
modern treatment of morality and ethics in the consideration of the
patentability of inventions.

B. Modern Treatment of Immoral and Unethical Inventions
In modern terms the "usefulness" requirement is called the
"utility" requirement. This utility requirement differs, however, not
just in name, but in substance from the traditional usefulness
requirement applied by judges beginning in 1817. Indeed, it differs
dramatically from the old usefulness requirement-morality and
ethics now play no role in the utility requirement. Instead, modern
patent law takes into account moral and ethical concerns through
the doctrine of patent eligibility and through limitations on
remedies. In this section I address all three of these modern
doctrines: the utility requirement, the eligibility requirement, and
limitations on remedies.
70

Id.

71

Id.

72 Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. 801, 801-802 (P.T.O. Bd. App. 1977) ("We view the

disclosed amusement device to be what is commonly referred to as a 'slot machine' or
'one-armed bandit.' ... The sole basis of the rejection of all of the claims is under 35 USC
101 as lacking patentable utility. . . . We find ourselves in agreement with appellants
and recognize that while some may consider gambling to be injurious to the public morals
and the good order of society, we cannot find any basis in 35 USC 101 or related sections
which justify a conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto
are void of patentable utility.").
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1. Utility
The modern utility requirement, in contrast to the historic
usefulness requirement, does not take into account morality or
ethics. The story of how this came to be starts with two old Supreme
Court cases.
The Supreme Court, while not addressing the usefulness
requirement in particular, long ago laid the groundwork for later
courts to distinguish between the rights granted by patents and
general laws restricting use of technology based upon public policy,
morality, or ethics. In short, in two cases decided in 1878 and 1880,
the Court held that a patent provides no defense to the alleged
violation of a generally-applicable law that limits use of the
patented invention. 73 In other words, the Court recognized that the
grant of a patent does not confer rights on the patent owner to
violate generally-applicable laws related to the same subject
matter. This recognition flows naturally from the basic principle
that a patent grants a right to exclude use of technology, not a right
to use technology. 74 But even if a patent granted a right to use
technology, that right would not extend to any use otherwise
deemed illegal. When the Patent Office grants a patent covering a
new drug, it does not authorize the patent owner to sell the new
drug to patients; the Food and Drug Administration is the
government agency that must approve the new drug's sale after
considering evidence of the drug's efficacy and safety.

7 Webber v. Virginia, 103 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1880) ('Congress never intended that
the patent laws should displace the police powers of the States, meaning by that term
those powers by which the health, good order, peace, and general welfare of the
community are promoted. Whatever rights are secured to inventors must be enjoyed in
subordination to this general authority of the State over all property within its limits.");
see also Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1878) ('The right of property in the
physical substance, which is the fruit of the discovery, is altogether distinct from the
right in the discovery itself, just as the property in the instruments or plate by which
copies of a map are multiplied is distinct from the copyright of the map itself. The right
to sell the Aurora oil was not derived from the letters-patent, but it existed and could
have been exercised before they were issued, unless it was prohibited by valid local
legislation. . . . [T]he use of the tangible property which comes into existence by the
application of the discovery is not beyond the control of State legislation, simply because
the patentee acquires a monopoly in his discovery.") (citations omitted).
7" Vaupel Textilmaschinen KG v. Meccanica Euro Italia S.P.A., 944 F.2d 870, 879
n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("It is elementary that a patent grants only the right to exclude
others and confers no right on its holder to make, use, or sell.").
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It took a long time for lower courts to use this distinction to
hold that the utility requirement does not concern itself with public
policy, morality, or ethics. While a lower court case, decided by the
Federal Circuit in 1991, seemed to hold open the possibility that
morality or ethics might render some inventions unpatentable, 75
the court later clarified its position in Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange
Bang, Inc., 76 a case decided in 1999. In this case the Federal Circuit
confronted a district court's invalidation of a patent for lack of
utility "on the ground that the patented invention was designed to
deceive customers by imitating another product and thereby
increasing sales of a particular good." 77 The Federal Circuit
reversed. 78
The Federal Circuit recognized Justice Story's formulation of
the usefulness requirement as excluding inventions that are
"injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society,"
and noted the fact that "[c]ourts have continued to recite Justice
Story's formulation." 79 But it also stated that "the principle that
[patents] are invalid if [their inventions] are principally designed to
serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly in
recent years."8 0 After reviewing the relevant historical precedent
following Justice Story's approach, the court flatly declined to follow
that precedent, holding instead that the precedent did not
represent the correct view of the doctrine of utility.81
Under the correct view, according to the court, "[t]he fact that
one product can be altered to make it look like another is in itself a
specific benefit sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of

75 Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d
1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ('Section 101 has also been interpreted to exclude inventions
deemed to be immoral, such as (until 1977) gambling machines. . . ."). The reference to
"until 1977" likely refers to Ex parte Murphy, 200 U.S.P.Q. at 802 , where the Patent
Office's Board of Appeals failed to find "any basis in 35 USC 101 or related sections which
justify a conclusion that inventions which are useful only for gambling ipso facto are void
of patentable utility."
76 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
77 Id. at 1365.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 1366 (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1018-19 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817)
(No. 8,568) (Story, J.)).
80 Id. at 1366-67.
81 Id. at 1367.
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utility." 82 Moreover, the court pointed out, the accused infringer did
not argue that using the patented invention violated the law. 83 "The
requirement of 'utility' in patent law," explained the court, "is not a
directive to the Patent and Trademark Office or the courts to serve
as arbiters of deceptive trade practices." 84 At the same time, the
court recognized, "Congress is free to declare particular types of
inventions unpatentable for a variety of reasons, including
deceptiveness." 85 Because Congress had not declared unpatentable
inventions with "the capacity to fool some members of the public,"
the court reversed the district court's judgment invalidating the
patent in question. 86 This understanding of the utility requirement
is still the governing law of the Federal Circuit today. And, given
that the Federal Circuit holds exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
from judgments in patent infringement cases and over appeals of
rejections of patent applications by the Patent Office, 87 this
understanding applies in all cases.

2. Eligibility
While modern patent law does not take into account moral or
ethical concerns using its utility requirement, it does-in a minor
way currently-take these concerns into account using its eligibility
requirement. Patent eligibility refers to the requirement that, to be
eligible for a patent, an invention or discovery must fall within the
categories of subject matter identified in the patent statute.
Specifically, according to the patent statute, the invention must be
a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
. . improvement thereof." 88 While this definition of eligible subject
matter is broad, Congress and the President have at least twice

82
83
84

Id.
Id. at 1367-68.
Id. at 1368. The court went on to explain that "[o]ther agencies, such as the

Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, are assigned the task
of protecting consumers from fraud and deception in the sale of food products." Id.
85

IJ

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) & (a)(4)(A) (2020).
88 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2020). In addition, the Supreme Court has identified nonstatutory exceptions to eligibility for abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of
nature. See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 215 (2014).
86

87
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specified exclusions. And one of these exclusions unquestionably
has moral and ethical underpinnings.
Before considering these legislatively-defined exclusions to
patent eligibility, however, it is important to recognize that the
Supreme Court eschewed use of the eligibility doctrine to limit
patentability based on its own understanding of relevant moral
concerns. In Diamond r. Chakrabarty, the Court concluded that a
live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.89 In the face of arguments that "grave risks
. . may be generated by research endeavors such as respondent's"
including "a serious threat to the human race," the "spread [of]
pollution and disease," the "loss of genetic diversity," and the
"depreciate [ion of] the value of human life," the Court rejected the
argument that it "should weigh . . potential hazards in considering
whether respondent's invention is patentable subject matter under
§ 101."90 Institutional competency and political accountability
formed the principal bases for rejecting this argument:
[W]e are without competence to entertain these argumentseither to brush them aside as fantasies generated by fear of the
unknown, or to act on them. The choice we are urged to make
is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative
process after the kind of investigation, examination, and study
that legislative bodies can provide and courts cannot. That
process involves the balancing of competing values and
interests, which in our democratic system is the business of
elected representatives.
Whatever their validity, the
contentions now pressed on us should be addressed to the
political branches of the Government, the Congress and the
Executive, and not to the courts. 9 1
In short, the Court deferred to Congress with respect to the
question of what subject matter ought to be patent ineligible based
upon moral, ethical, or any other concerns. Thus, it is important to
recognize what limitations on eligibility have been enacted.
The first legislatively-defined exclusion relates to nuclear
bombs. Within one year of the bombings of Hiroshima and

89
90
91

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305-10 (1980).
Id. at 317.
Id.
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Nagasaki, President Truman signed into law the Atomic Energy
Act.92 Buried in that Act lay statutory exclusions of inventions
related to nuclear bombs: "No patent shall hereafter be granted for
any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the production
of fissionable material or in the utilization of fissionable material
or atomic energy for a military weapon."9 3 The Act goes on to state:
"No patent hereafter granted shall confer any rights with respect to
any invention or discovery to the extent that such invention or
discovery is used in the production of fissionable material or in the
utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military
weapon." 94 Morality and ethics, however, did not provide the basis
for excluding from patent eligibility inventions related to nuclear
bombs. Instead, according to the Senate Report accompanying the
Act, these exclusions sought to consolidate and control this type of
research within federally controlled research facilities, and also to
eliminate publication of information regarding nuclear technology
through the patent system. 95 Indeed, the Act created a Patent
Compensation Board that, according to the Senate Report, sought
"to provide inventors with financial inducements in lieu of patent
rights." 96
The second legislatively-defined exclusion to patent eligibility,
by contrast, unquestionably finds its roots in ethical and moral
concerns. In 2011, the America Invents Act ("AIA") excluded from
patent eligibility inventions related to human cloning. 97 The
relevant part of the Act, which remains uncodified, states that,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue
Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755.
Id. at § 11(a)(1).
94 Id. at § 11(a)(2).
95 S. REP. No. 79-1211, at 26 ("In sections 4 and 6 the bill provides for a Government
monopoly of the production of fissionable material and atomic weapons. In considering
the patent implications of these provisions, the committee concluded that private patents
can play no role in fields of activity reserved exclusively to the Government. For this
reason, and to eliminate risks of disclosure of restricted information, risks which would
be certain to arise under normal patent procedures, the bill provides that inventions and
discoveries in these fields shall not be patentable matter.").
96 Id. ("To assure the Commission of access to new inventions and to provide
inventors with financial inducements in lieu of patent rights, the bill requires that such
inventions be reported to the Commission and creates a Patent Compensation Board
with authority to make awards to inventors.").
97 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
92

91
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on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism." 98 The
USPTO considers this provision to be a limitation on subject matter
eligibility. 99
The legislative history indicates the motivation of those who
had a particular interest in this provision. Largely parroting the
language of the legislation, Representative Lamar Smith stated
that "this section operates to prohibit the use of appropriated funds
to issue a patent containing claim that encompasses a human
individual."100 He, however, also explained that the provision is
"directed as preventing the [Patent Office] from approving
inventions related to human cloning."101 Besides explaining his
belief about inventions the provision would encompass and
therefore bar from patent eligibility, he also identified various
inventions he believed the provision would not encompass and
therefore would remain patent eligible.10 2
Besides Representative Smith, the Patent Office's James
Rogan presented a letter to Congress indicating that the Patent
Office viewed the provision, known as the Weldon Amendment after
Representative Dave Weldon, "as fully consistent with [the Patent

98

Id.

99 See

U.S.

PATENT

&

TRADEMARK

OFFICE,

MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

PROCEDURE § 2105 ('Congress has excluded claims directed to or encompassing a human
organism from eligibility.").
100 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1183 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
101 157 CONG. REC. 90, H4451 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith).
102 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1183 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Lamar
Smith). ("1. [A]ny chemical compound or composition, whether obtained from animals or
human beings or produced synthetically, and whether identical to or distinct from a
chemical structure as found in an animal or human being, including but not limited to
nucleic acids, polypeptides, proteins, antibodies and hormones; 2. [C]ells, tissue, organs
or other bodily components produced through human intervention, whether obtained
from animals, human beings, or other sources; including but not limited to stem cells,
stem cell derived tissues, stem cell lines, and viable synthetic organs; 3. [M]ethods for
creating, modifying, or treating human organisms, including but not limited to methods
for creating embryos through in vitro fertilization, methods of somatic cell nuclear
transfer, medical or genetic therapies, methods for enhancing fertility, and methods for
implanting embryos; 4. [A] nonhuman organism incorporating one or more genes taken
from a human organism, including but not limited to a transgenic plant or animal, or
animal models used for scientific research.").
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Office's] policy on the non-patentability of human life-forms."1 03 He
went on to explain:
The USPTO understands the Weldon Amendment to provide
unequivocal congressional backing for the long-standing USPTO
policy of refusing to grant any patent containing a claim that
encompasses any member of the species Homo sapiens at any stage
of development. It has long been USPTO practice to reject any claim
in a patent application that encompasses a human life-form at any
stage of development, including a human embryo or human fetus;
hence claims directed to living "organisms" are to be rejected unless
they include the adjective "nonhuman."1 0 4
The Patent Office thus understood the legislation as
confirming its refusal to grant a patent covering a human being "at
any stage of development, including a human embryo or human

fetus." 105
The Family Research Council likewise weighed in on the
legislation, supporting passage of the Weldon Amendment. Among
other things, the Family Research Council highlighted its
understanding of what the provision would cover:
The Weldon Amendment's use of the term "human organism"
does include human embryos, human fetuses, human-animal
chimeras, "she-male" human embryos, or human embryos
created with genetic material from more than one embryo. The
Weldon Amendment's use of "human organism" does not
include the process of creating human embryos, such as human
cloning, nor does it include non-human organisms, e.g.,
animals. 106
Thus, it believed the provision would cover more than just
human embryos and fetuses but clarified that under its
understanding the provision would not cover the process of human
cloning.
Notably, the Patent Office highlighted their belief the
legislation would merely confirm the longstanding policy of the

103
104

Id. at E1184 (statement of James Rogan, U.S. Patent Office).
Id.

105 Id.
106

Id.
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Patent Office.10 7 The Family Research Council provided more detail
with respect to the Patent Office's historical practice.
The Family Research Council first cited what it referred to as
the "Quigg memo," published in the Patent Office's Official Gazette
on January 5, 1993.108 Written by Donald Quigg, the Assistant
Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, the memo
announced in light of several recent cases that "[t]he Patent and
Trademark Office now considers nonnaturally occurring nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including animals, to be
patentable subject matter within the scope of 35 U.S.C. [§] 101."109
The memo, however, went on to clarify that "[a] claim directed to or
including within its scope a human being will not be considered
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. [§] 101."110 As for why,
the memo explained that "[t]he grant of a limited, but exclusive
property right in a human being is [unconstitutional].""'
The Family Research Council also cited "an official media
advisory issued on April 2, 1998 in response to news about [a]
patent application directed to a human/non-human chimera."112
Significantly, the media advisory quoted and cited Justice Story's
formulation of the usefulness requirement from 1817 by stating
that "courts have interpreted the utility requirement to exclude
inventions deemed to be 'injurious to the well being, good policy, or
good morals of society." 113 This formulation provided the basis for
the Patent Office to make it clear that it would not issue any patent
on a human/non-human chimera:

107 Id. at E1184-85 ('The USPTO understands the Weldon Amendment to provide
unequivocal congressional backing for the long-standing USPTO policy of refusing to
grant any patent containing a claim that encompasses any member of the species Homo
sapiens at any stage of development.").
108 Id. at E1185. The Family Research Council mistakenly identified the date the
Quigg memo was written as 1917, when in fact it was written in 1987. 1146 Off. Gaz.
Pat. & Trademark Office 309 (Jan. 5, 1993) (including the date "Apr. 7, 1987").
109 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1185 (daily ed. June 23, 2011).
110

Id.
111 1146 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 309.

157 CONG. REC. 91, E1185 (daily ed. June 23, 2011).
Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998) (quoting and citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15
F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (Story, J.)). The media advisory also noted
that Justice Story's statement had been quoted in Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma ProduktUnd Mktg. Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Id.
112

113
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[T]he existence of a patent application directed to human/nonhuman chimera has recently been discussed in the news media. It
is the position of the PTO that inventions directed to human/nonhuman chimera could, under certain circumstances, not be
patentable because, among other things, they would fail to meet the
public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement. 114
Thus, the Patent Office indicated it would rely upon "the public
policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement" to deny
patentability. 115 The next year, however, the Federal Circuit would
hold that the utility requirement did not concern itself with the
moral or ethical nature of any particular invention. 116
Beyond providing details with respect to the long practice of
the Patent Office to deny patents covering human organisms, the
Family Research Council also highlighted the fact that the Weldon
Amendment for several years had been added to Patent Office
appropriation legislation. 117 When he first introduced the
amendment, Representative Dave Weldon similarly explained
what he understood the provision would and would not do:
[T]he U.S. Patent Office has already issued patents on genes,
stems cells, animals with human genes, and a host of nonbiologic products used by humans, but it has not issued patents
on claims directed to human organisms, including human

114 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998). For a detailed explanation of the
circumstances causing the Patent Office to issue this media advisory, see Rick Weiss,
Patent Sought for Part-Human Creatures, WASH. POST (April 2, 1998),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/science/april98/patent.htm [https://per
ma.cc/M967-2A23].
115 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Facts on Patenting Life Forms
Having a Relationship to Humans (Apr. 1, 1998).
16 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("To
be sure, since Justice Story's opinion in Lowell v. Lewis, it has been stated that
inventions that are 'injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of society'
are unpatentable. . . . [B]ut the principle that inventions are invalid if they are
principally designed to serve immoral or illegal purposes has not been applied broadly
in recent years." (citations omitted)).
117 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1185 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) ('The Weldon Amendment is
contained in the annual Commerce, Justice and Science Appropriations bills (CJS) and
prevents the patenting of humans. Congress has passed it each year since 2004....").
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embryos and fetuses. My amendment would not affect the
former, but would simply affirm the latter. 118

Thus, Representative Weldon focused on excluding from
patent eligibility human embryos and fetuses. One explanation for
the need for Representative Weldon to introduce his amendment,
however, may be the fact that the Federal Circuit eliminated the
very legal basis for the Patent Office's longstanding policy of
refusing to issue patents on human/non-human chimeras-the
moral or ethical aspect of the usefulness requirement. 119
When he spoke in favor of the Weldon Amendment in 2011,
Representative Christopher Smith reintroduced Representative
Weldon's prior testimony from 2003.120 Characterizing the
legislation as codifying a "pro-life policy," he also added his own
comments in favor of the legislation:
This amendment and USPTO policy reflect a commonsense
understanding that no member of the human species is an
"invention," or property to be licensed for financial gain.
Patents on human organisms commodify life and allow
profiteers to financially gain from the biology and life of
another human person. 121
These comments highlighted moral and ethical reasons for
supporting the Weldon Amendment. Representative Christopher
Smith further highlighted the moral underpinnings of the provision
by explaining that "[c]odifying a ban on patenting of humans would
not violate international obligations . .. in which member countries
can exclude from patentability subject matter to prevent
commercial exploitation which is 'necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, [and] to protect human, animal or plant life."'122

118 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1179 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (testimony of Representative
Dave Weldon originally given in support of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004,
Public Law 108-199, 634, 118 Stat. 3, 101).
119 Juicy Whip, Inc, 185 F.3d at 1366-67.
120 157 CONG. REC. 91, E1178-80 (daily ed. June 23, 2011).
121 Id. at E1177.
122 Id. (quoting and citing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ('TRIPS"), Article 27, Section 5). He also highlighted that "the European
Union prevents patents on human embryos on the basis of morality and public order
without conflicting with the TRIPs agreement." Id. at E1178 (citing Guidelines for
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3. Limitation on Remedies
In addition to using patent eligibility to address moral and
ethical concerns, modern patent law also takes into account moral
and ethical concerns by limiting remedies in appropriate
circumstances. In particular, the patent statute limits remedies for
"a medical practitioner's performance of a medical activity that
constitutes an infringement" under either direct infringement or
inducement of infringement. 123 The medical activity in question is
"the performance of a medical or surgical procedure on a body" but
does not include "(i) the use of a patented machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter in violation of such patent, (ii) the practice of
a patented use of a composition of matter in violation of such patent,
or (iii) the practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology
patent." 124 The patent owner in these situations does not have any
remedy, whether injunctive relief, damages, or attorney fees. 125 One
of the ideas underlying this limitation on remedies is the ethical
obligation that doctors must be allowed to use their skills to aid
their patients. 126

C. CurrentEligibility Reform Efforts
As shown, while modern patent law does not address moral or
ethical concerns using the utility requirement, it does address them
in targeted ways using limitations on patent eligibility and
remedies. Significantly, however, current eligibility reform efforts,
Substantive Examination, European Patent Office, Part C, Chapter IV, Section 4.5, iii
(Rule 28c)).
123 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2020).
124 Id. § 287(c)(2)(A). The statute defines various other terms including "medical
practitioner," "body," and "patented use of a composition of matter." Id. § 287(c)(2)(B)(G). It also excludes from the limitation on remedies the activities anyone "who is
engaged in the commercial development, manufacture, sale, importation, or distribution
of a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or the provision of pharmacy or
clinical laboratory services" in certain situations. Id. § 287(c)(3).
125 Id. § 287(c)(1) ('With respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a medical
activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a) or (b), the provisions of
sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the medical practitioner or
against a related health care entity with respect to such medical activity.").
126 See Leisa Talbert Peschel, Revisiting the Compromise of 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 16
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 299, 314 (2008) ('Opponents of the issuance of medical procedure
patents highlight the ethical conflicts that granting these patents creates for
physicians.").

298

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 90:2

and particularly certain reform proposals, would eliminate the
limitation on patent eligibility. Remarkably, I am the only person
who has recognized this potential change in the law.
A joint proposal by the American Intellectual Property Law
Association and the Intellectual Property Owners Association
provides one example. It would amend 35 U.S.C. § 101 and, in the
process, overturn the prohibition on any patent issuing on a claim
directed to or encompassing a human organism. 127 To see how this
is so, consider the proposed text of the statute.
First, the proposal would create a new subsection, § 101(a),
that would state that "[w]hoever invents or discovers, and claims as
an invention, any useful process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or any useful improvement thereof, shall be
entitled to a patent therefor, subject only to the conditions and
requirements set forth in this title." 128 As discussed above, the
relevant part of the AIA states that, "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or
encompassing a human organism."1 29 Significantly, however, this
language remains uncodified. In the AIA, Congress did not codify
this law.130 It is not part of Title 35. As a result, a statutory
provision stating that the only basis to find a lack of patentability
are the conditions and requirements set forth in Title 35 would
overrule this uncodified law. 131
Second, in place of any other standard of ineligibility, the
proposal would put in place a statutory test in a new subsection,
§ 101(b), stating that "[a] claimed invention is ineligible . . if and
127 Joint AIPLA-IPO
Proposal on Patent Eligibility, AIPLA (May 2018),
https://www.aipla.org/policy-advocacy/legislative/joint-aipla-ipo-proposal-on-patenteligibility [https://perma.cc/9NEC-2SLD].
128 Id.
129 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
130 See id.
131 See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("There are two wellsettled categories of repeals by implication-(1) [W]here provisions in the two acts are in
irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied
repeal of the earlier one; and (2) if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier
one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the
earlier act. But, in either case, the intention of the legislature to repeal must be clear
and manifest; otherwise, at least as a general thing, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue to speak, so far
as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment.").
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only if the claimed invention as a whole (i) exists in nature
independently of and prior to any human activity or (ii) is
performed solely in the human mind." 132 This test would not
necessarily exclude "a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism"133 because any claimed human organism might be
genetically modified or in some other way not "exist[] in nature
independently of and prior to any human activity."13 4 And it
certainly would not exclude human/non-human chimeras.
Regardless, whatever the consequences of particular reform
proposals, and whichever proposal may in the end be adopted by
Congress and enacted into law or not, the current patent eligibility
reform efforts provide a basis to pause and reconsider not only the
AIA's prohibition on any patent issuing with a claim directed to or
encompassing a human being, but also more generally the question
of whether moral or ethical concerns ought to impact the patent
system and, if so, how.
II. MORAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS RELEVANT TO
PATENTABILITY

There are many moral and ethical concerns with technology,
concerns the patent system might take into account. 135 Different
technologies, however, raise different moral and ethical concerns.
While in the distant past moral and ethical concerns primarily
related to gambling and deception, modern concerns primarily
relate to biotechnology and human reproduction, including genes,

Joint AIPLA-IPO Proposalon Patent Eligibility, supra note 127.
133 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 340
(2011).
134 Joint AIPLA-IPO Proposalon Patent Eligibility, supra note 127.
135 Indeed, there are moral and ethical concerns with the patent system itself,
regardless of the particular technology of particular patents. See E. RICHARD GOLD

&

132

BARTHA MARIA KNOPPERS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IP & ETHICS 16 (LexisNexis 2009) (noting

that some skepticism "is linked to ethical concerns directly related to patent rights"
including "distributional issues (e.g., between developed and developing countries),
management issues (e.g., whether government health authorities have the ability to roll
out new medical interventions in an efficient manner), [and] equity (e.g., whether private
enterprise should be able to profit from innovation funded largely through public
support)"). Here, however, I focus attention on moral and ethical concerns with the
technology that may be covered by patent rights. Id. ('Much of the controversy has little
to do with patent law itself. For example, a rejection of biotechnology or a belief that only
God can own life can suffice to vocalize opposition.").
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gene editing, cloning, human-animal chimeras, embryos, embryonic
stem cells, and abortion technologies. Indeed, the literature
addressing moral and ethical concerns with biotechnology and
human reproduction is vast and robust. Here I highlight two of the
moral and ethical concerns with patenting these types of
technologies: concerns with autonomy and the value of human life.
I also describe what may be considered the countervailing concern
with utilitarianism-the desire to encourage the development of
technologies-before turning to the legal question of how the law
ought to deal with moral and ethical objections to technologies.

A. Prominent Concerns
Modern moral and ethical concerns with patenting particular
technologies primarily relate to the field of biotechnology and
human reproduction and involve conceptions of autonomy and
valuing human life.i36 I discuss both here. I also highlight other
potential concerns with patented technology more generally before
turning to the countervailing concern of utilitarianism.
1.

Autonomy

One moral or ethical concern with patenting biotechnology and
other technologies related to human reproduction is autonomy, or,
in other words, control over one's human body. 137 Muireann
Quigley, for example, describes concern with doctors filing patent
applications covering a cell line-and methods for producing
136 See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on
Innovation and Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. Rev.
295, 297 (2007) (discussing how "[m]oral opponents of gene patents tend to be concerned
with the implications of gene patents with respect to personal autonomy and human
dignity").
137 As a philosophical matter, concern over autonomy is not necessarily limited to
human autonomy, but may be extended to other life forms. See, e.g., VANDANA SHIVA,

BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 23 (North Atlantic Books 2016)

('Patenting living organisms encourages two forms of violence. First, life-forms are
treated as if they are mere machines, thus denying their self-organizing capacity.
Second, by allowing the patenting of future generations of plants and animals, the selfreproducing capacity of living organisms is denied."); id. at 123 ('The conservation of
biodiversity, at the most fundamental level, is the ethical recognition that other species
and cultures have rights, that they do not merely derive value from economic exploitation
by a few privileged humans. The patenting and ownership of life-forms is ethically a
statement of the opposite belief.").
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products using the cell line-when the cell line and methods were
derived from a patient without the patient's permission.138 In her
view, "the moral justification for, and analytical route to, ownership
of (and property rights in) separated biomaterials is quite
straightforward, if we start with self-ownership."139 She explains
that "[s]elf-ownership rights are those which persons ought to be
accorded in virtue of their autonomy and which, when duly
recognised (and enforced), can be seen as forming a perimeter of
normative protection around their personal domain." 14 0
This concern with autonomy extends beyond situations in
which a patient has not given permission to doctors to obtain patent
rights based on the patient's unique genetic characteristics. Indeed,
this concern with autonomy may be used to explain opposition to
patents covering human genes-any human's genes 141-as well as
human cloning and related technologies, including embryos and
embryonic stem cells. This concern, moreover, may also be used to
explain opposition to patents covering technology used to inhibit
human reproduction.
On the one hand, some may use autonomy as a basis to argue
that the patent system should not interfere with individuals'
abilities to control their own reproductive system by granting
someone the right to exclude use of technologies impacting that
system. 142 On the other hand, others may use autonomy as a basis
to argue that the patent system should not create incentives for the

138 MUIREANN QUIGLEY, SELF-OWNERSHIP, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE HUMAN BODY

4-5 (Cambridge University Press 2018) (describing concern with UCLA doctors filing
patent applications covering a cell line, and "a variety of methods for producing products
from the cells," derived from a patient being treated for leukemia without his
permission).
139 Id. at 305.
140 Id. at 305-06.
141 See, e.g., Holman, supra note 136, at 297 (describing how some "have questioned
the equity of allowing a researcher who succeeds in chemically characterizing a genetic
mutation to obtain exclusive patent rights relating to that mutation, and argue that
patients suffering from a genetic disease should retain control over the mutations
associated with their disease").
142 See, e.g., Timothy J. McCoy, Biomedical Process Patents: Should They Be
Restricted by Ethical Limitations?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 515 (1992) ("To the extent
interferes with physician autonomy or
that patenting biomedical processes
confidentiality, valid ethical problems may arise.").
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development
of technologies that abort pregnancies
nontherapeutic reasons, particularly for viable fetuses. 14 3

for

2. Valuing Human Life
Another moral or ethical concern with patenting biotechnology
and other technologies related to human reproduction is protecting
the value of human life, or human dignity. 144 This concern with
human dignity may be used to explain opposition to patents
covering human genes, human-animal chimeras, human cloning,
embryos, and embryonic stem cells. 14 5 But this concern may be used
to oppose patents covering technology used to destroy or support
the degradation of human life, including technologies that abort
pregnancies for nontherapeutic reasons, particularly for viable
fetuses.1 46 This concern likewise explains opposition to patents
restricting the ability to obtain medicine or other care to treat
disease. 14 7

143 See Trotter Hardy, Introduction:Boundaries of Intellectual Property Symposium,
51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 327, 334 (2009) ("Moral questions can most certainly be
implicated by inventive activity; take research involving stem cells, or the patenting of
animal (not to say, human) life generally, or my own hypothetical: a patent sought for
an improved process to accomplish late-term abortions. Aside from the infrequently
invoked requirement of utility' in this context, U.S. patent law does not typically specify
moral constraints on the patentability of inventions. But, as Bagley shows, there is good
reason to consider a different approach.").
144 See, e.g., Holman, supra note 136, at 297 ("For many, the genome possesses a
singularly important, perhaps even sacred status as the blueprint of life. The notion that
anyone can obtain private property rights in such a fundamental aspect of our common
human heritage strikes some as an affront to human dignity.").
145 See id. at 295.
146 See Hardy, supra note 143 at 334 ('Moral questions can most certainly be
implicated by inventive activity; take research involving stem cells, or the patenting of
animal (not to say, human) life generally, or my own hypothetical: a patent sought for
an improved process to accomplish late-term abortions. Aside from the infrequently
invoked requirement of utility' in this context, U.S. patent law does not typically specify
moral constraints on the patentability of inventions. But, as Bagley shows, there is good
reason to consider a different approach.").
147 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2020) ('With respect to a medical practitioner's
performance of a medical activity that constitutes an infringement under section 271(a)
or (b), the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity with respect to such medical
activity.").
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3. Other Concerns
There are, of course, other moral and ethical concerns with
technologies that might be the subject of patents. Some think the
patent system should protect or at least not harm animals or the
environment. Indeed, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") identifies "protect[ing] human,
animal or plant life or health" and "avoid[ing] serious prejudice to
the environment" as examples of moral reasons to exclude certain
inventions from patentability. 148 The point is that, while I have
highlighted autonomy and human dignity given their relevancy to
biotechnology and human reproduction, areas of significant recent
attention, there are numerous moral and ethical concerns that any
individual might rely upon to suggest that the patent system not
provide rights and incentives related to particular technologies.

B. CountervailingConcern of Utilitarianism
Set against the moral and ethical concerns addressed in the
previous section stands the concern of utilitarianism, or, in other
words, the desire to encourage the development of technologies. In
this context, it reflects the idea that the patent system ought to be
used to encourage the development of new inventions.
Utilitarianism suggests that patents ought to incentivize the
creation of new technology regardless of any countervailing moral
or ethical concerns. A more moderate approach, however, simply
suggests that moral and ethical concerns should be weighed against
the value of encouraging inventive efforts.
Consider, for example, moral and ethical concerns with socalled bioprospecting, "the process of looking for potentially
valuable genetic resources and biochemical compounds in
nature." 149 One approach is to weigh or balance moral and ethical
concerns with bioprospecting, on the one hand, with the goal of
identifying useful inventions using bioprospecting, on the other
148 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).

149 PADMASHREE GEHL SAMPATH, REGULATING BIOPROSPECTING: INSTITUTIONS FOR
DRUG RESEARCH, ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING 1 (United Nations University Press

2005) ("Biodiversity prospecting or bioprospecting ... refers to the process of looking for
potentially valuable genetic resources and biochemical compounds in nature.").
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hand. 150 Indeed, one conception of the right approach to addressing
moral and ethical concerns with gene patenting is the idea that the
patent system ought to balance relevant public interests. 151 These
public interests include both preserving access to science (favoring
limiting patent rights) and furthering inventive efforts that benefit
society (favoring expanding patent rights).1 52 And with respect to
both, the value of the relevant technology may also be considered,
for example, in terms of the possibility of improving human health.
What this discussion highlights is the determination of
whether morality or ethics justifies excluding subject matter from
the patent system (or putting in place other limits, such as limits
on remedies) is ultimately a matter of policy.1 53 It requires weighing
the strength of the relevant moral or ethical concerns and the
strength of the countervailing interest in encouraging inventive
efforts.

150 Id. at 2 ('This book is an investigation into optimal property rights structures and
institutional mechanisms that can facilitate the process of bioprospecting for drug
research while balancing the goals of optimal drug R&D with the diverse demands placed
by recognition of rights over traditional knowledge and access to genetic resources,
benefit-sharing, and biodiversity conservation.").

151

AURORA PLOMER, PATENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ACCESS TO SCIENCE 162 (Edward

Elger Publishing 2015) ('Intellectual property rights and patents were controversially
extended to isolated genes and cells in the US since the 1980s and have become a global
phenomenon since, raising profound moral and legal challenges for patent offices and
constitutional courts around the world. At the heart of these challenges lies the question
of the balance between public rights of access to science and the private rights of
individuals over their scientific creations or 'inventions'.").
152 Id. at 169 ('The underlying rationale is to avoid the private appropriation and
enclosure of basic areas of science and knowledge which are the building blocks of
scientific research and which are needed to advance research and develop downstream
technological applications. Human rights principles and ideals may not be expressly
articulated in these rationales. But they are arguably implicit in the idea that the aim
of protecting the interests of inventors is not to support the self-serving interest of a few
in market economies but to give due recognition to individual creative effort and in this
way foster the advancement of science and knowledge as public goods.").
153 See Amy L. Landers, Patentable Subject Matter As a Policy Driver, 53 HOUS. L.
REv. 505, 528 (2015) ("[T]he European Directive is based on an expressed policy directed
to facilitate research and development in biotechnology, including the social benefits of
facilitating industrial development, research, and funding, fighting diseases, and
developing the environment. During the course of formulating the Directive, the
European system modified its proposal to include certain exceptions including uses that
are 'unpatentable [because] their commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre
public or morality. . . .' This is one example of a patentability determination that was
explicitly driven by considered policy choices." (citation omitted)).
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Here I have introduced moral and ethical concerns related to
particular technologies that have proven controversial in recent
times, biotechnology and technologies related to human
reproduction. I have also introduced the competing concern with
encouraging the development of new technologies. I admittedly
have not cataloged all of the relevant moral and ethical concerns
with technology generally, but instead merely sought to introduce
some of the most significant concerns in light of some the most
controversial, modern technologies. Whatever the relevant moral or
ethical concerns and whatever the particular technologies,
however, the next question is how the patent system ought to
resolve competing arguments over moral and ethical objections.
III. REINTRODUCING CONSIDERATIONS OF MORALITY AND
ETHICS INTO PATENT LAW

If patent law ought to take into account one or more of the
moral and ethical concerns I have described-or any others-the
next question is how the patent system might do so. In this regard,
drawing upon the last point-that the determination of whether
morality or ethics justifies excluding subject matter from the patent
system (or putting in place other limits, such as limits on remedies)
is ultimately a matter of policy-I distinguish between judicial,
legislative, and agency control over moral and ethical concerns. And
to do so I draw from the contract law doctrine of voidness as against
public policy and its criticisms.

A. JudicialApproach
As shown, the historical approach to dealing with moral and
ethical concerns related to patenting technologies relied primarily
upon judges making determinations using the usefulness
requirement. 154 Significantly, this approach closely resembled the
modern contract doctrine that renders some contracts and parts of
contracts void as against public policy.155 That is, historically judges

154 See supra Part I.A.
155 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 178(1) (AM. LAW INST.
1981) ("A promise or other term of an agreement is unenforceable on grounds of public
policy if legislation provides that it is unenforceable or the interest in its enforcement is
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were effectively left to determine whether patents were void as
against public policy. Like the contract doctrine, while judges might
have derived the public policy from a relevant statute, they
consistently derived the public policy from traditional judicial
notions of right and wrong. 156
Despite the persistence of the public policy doctrine in contract
law, this is certainly not the modern approach in the patent law. 157
Nor is it the best approach. An English judge once famously
described the contract doctrine of public policy as "a very unruly
horse," because "once you get astride it you never know where it
will carry you." 158 Indeed, "[i]t may lead you from the sound law." 159
That is, it is a doctrine that lacks significant constraints and
therefore holds the potential to lead to unpredictable outcomes that
seem to depend upon caprice rather than any rule or standard of
decision. These and other common criticisms of contract's public
policy doctrine would apply with particular salience were patent
law to leave determinations of morality and ethics to judges.
For example, one criticism of the public policy doctrine in the
context of contract law is that it balances interests ex post and
therefore undermines the commercial goals of certainty and

clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy against the enforcement of
such terms.").
156 Compare, e.g., Rickard v. Du Bon, 103 F. 868, 869-873 (2d Cir. 1900) (invalidating
patent based upon policy derived from judicial sensibility that patents should not "extend
protection to those which confer no other benefit upon the public than the opportunity of
profiting by deception and fraud") with David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to
Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 563, 581 (2012) ("Although
categorizing cases can be a challenging and subtle exercise, a sizable number of these
cases can be cast as attacks based on the underlying agreement's contravention or
undermining of a statute or regulation. The remainder of the cases can be classified as
an attack on the contract based on broader, more general public policy grounds and
interests."). I say that in patent cases judges "might have derived the public policy from
a relevant statute" because my study of the relevant patent cases reveals little such
constraint-no real reference to statutes outlawing or even limiting use of the technology
in question-even when invalidating patents based upon moral or ethical concerns. In
short, the patent cases all fall within the second type enumerated by David Friedman,
those in which judges identify "broader, more general public policy grounds and
interests." Id. Notably, Friedman concedes that this second type of case "appears to
present the most disorder and 'unruliness."' Id. at 615.
157 See supra Part I.B.
158 Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.).
159 Id.
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reliability.16 0 Likewise, one problem with judicial resolution of
moral and ethical concerns with patenting is the ex post aspect of
the determination. Judges would necessarily determine whether to
invalidate patents long after the investment in research and
development has occurred, even long after the patents have issued.
Such after-the-fact resolution of the validity of patents undermines
the certainty and reliability of patents as tools to support
investment decisions.
Indeed, a related criticism of contract law's public policy
doctrine is the more general critique that it does not provide
certainty and predictability. 161 It is difficult to predict how judges
will resolve disputes over public policy, particularly policies derived
not from statutes or regulations but instead from judges' own sense
of policy.162 Judicial resolution of moral and ethical concerns with
the technology of patents similarly would not provide the certainty
and predictability necessary for a property-rights regime such as
patent law to spur investment in research and development. 163 And,
unlike other patent law doctrines where an adversarial process
would assist the relevant decisionmaker to make a decision based

160 See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1023, 1103 (2009) ("New York uses formal doctrine
to enforce bargains strictly and displays little tolerance of equitable principles that seek
to balance interests ex post; California, by contrast, is far more willing to revise contracts
ex post on the grounds of fairness, equity, or public policy. Miller concludes that '[t]he
revealed preferences of sophisticated parties support arguments by Schwartz, Scott[,]
and others that formalistic rules offer superior value for the interpretation and
enforcement of commercial contracts."') (quoting Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargaining on the
Red-Eye: New Light on Contract Theory 1 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
08-21, 2008), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1129805) [https://perma.cc/TC2F-YN5F].
161 See, e.g., Roger J. Johns & Mark S. Blodgett, Fairness at the Expense of
Commercial Certainty: The International Emergence of Unconscionability and Illegality
as Exceptions to the Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Bank Guarantees, 31
N. ILL. U. L. REV. 297, 333 (2011) (noting that the contract public policy doctrine of
illegality "damage[s] ...
commercial certainty, in general, by elevating fairness-based
judgments about the risk-allocation choices of the parties to the underlying contract").
162 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31
CARDOZo L. REV. 1475, 1496 (2010) (noting that "the breadth of the public policy doctrine
impairs the certainty and predictability of contractual enforcement").
163 See David 0. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication:
Rules and Standards, 46 CONN. L. REV. 415, 473 (2013) (discussing that "the
encouragement of investment in research and development by prospective patent
applicants is one of the very goals of patent law, and bright-line rules may encourage
this investment by eliminating or at least reducing risk associated with this behavior").
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on the best available information, 164 there is less reason to delay
resolution of moral and ethical concerns with the underlying
technology.
Other concerns with the public policy doctrine are that judges
have no particular expertise to make policy decisions and,
moreover, they are not politically accountable for their decisions.
The concern with judges deciding matters of policy applies broadly
to various areas of the law dependent upon expertise and
information gathering.16 5 Judges have no particular expertise to
decide what is or is not a relevant moral or ethical concern
justifying the denial of patentability. Nor are federal judges
politically accountable for their decisions with respect to
controversial subject matter. Patent law is a matter of federal law,
and Congress has given exclusive jurisdiction over patent disputes
to the federal courts. 166 Federal judges, of course, have the benefit
of life tenure. 167 They purposefully are insulated from political
accountability. While this insulation is a feature with respect to
encouraging fidelity to the law rather than the views of the
majority, insulation from political accountability is not a feature if
the law merely directs the decisionmaker to make a decision based
on his or her own view of the relevant moral and ethical concerns. 168
164 The novelty and non-obviousness analyses represent patent law doctrines where
an adversarial process generates significant informational benefits. In particular, as
compared to patent examiners, accused infringers have much greater incentive to
research prior art for potential use in a novelty or obviousness defense.
165 See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 66 (2004) (arguing in the
context of the Administrative Procedure Act that a principal purpose was "to avoid
judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements which courts lack both expertise
and information to resolve").
166 Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 261-62 (2013) (noting that "Congress ...
vest[ed]
exclusive jurisdiction over actual patent cases in the federal district courts and exclusive
appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit") (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1295(a)(1)).
167 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (stating that federaljudges "shall hold their Offices during
good Behaviour").
168 Justice Scalia made similar points repeatedly in various controversial contexts
involving conflicting views of morality and ethics. See, e.g., Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, 497 U.S. 502, 520-21 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Leaving this matter
[regarding abortion] to the political process is not only legally correct, it is pragmatically
so. That alone-and not lawyerly dissection of federal judicial precedents-can produce
compromises satisfying a sufficient mass of the electorate that this deeply felt issue will
cease distorting the remainder of our democratic process."); Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 293 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that "the point
at which the means necessary to preserve [life] become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,'
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In sum, given the lack of certainty and predictability ex post
decisions of morality and ethics engender, combined with the lack
of expertise and accountability of judges, there is significant reason
to think that judges should not be deciding which technologies
should not be patentable based on moral and ethical concerns.
While this lack of certainty and predictability is tolerated in the
context of contract law, a recent study has shown that about twothirds of invocations of public policy in contract disputes relate to
policies derived from statutes and regulations, which tend to
provide at least some order to the doctrine. 169 By contrast, my study
of the relevant patent cases invoking moral or ethical concerns to
invalidate patents reveals little such constraint-no real reference
to statutes outlawing or even limiting use of the technology in
question-and indeed the Federal Circuit has roundly rejected the
idea of using statutes or regulation as a basis to invoke
considerations of morality or ethics to invalidate patents. 170 Thus,
next I turn to other possible approaches.

B. Legislative Approach
Given the same considerations studied in the last section, the
best approach to dealing with the patentability of controversial
technologies-technologies some may deem immoral or unethicalis to have the President and Congress determine eligible subject
matter through legislation. This would not involve leaving patent
eligibility decisions to an agency-here the U.S. Patent and

are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any
better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City
telephone directory .... ").
169 Friedman, supra note 156, at 615("The one-third of the cases where the defense
appeals broadly to public policy (and typically fails) appears to present the most disorder
and 'unruliness."'). Friedman goes on to suggest that "[t]he first step in taming the
[unruly] horse [that is the public policy defense in contract law] should be to declare that
if there is no regulation or statute to invoke, the public policy defense is completely
unavailable." Id. at 618. Applied to patent law, given that all of the relevant decisions
appear to be based on judicial notions of morality and ethics not necessarily to regulation
or statute, this proposal would suggest no public policy defense in patent law-at least
one applied by judges.
170 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ('The
requirement of 'utility' in patent law," explained the court, "is not a directive to the
Patent and Trademark Office or the courts to serve as arbiters of deceptive trade
practices.").
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Trademark Office. I discuss that alternative next. No, short of an
override of a veto, Congress and the President would need to agree
upon any exclusion from the patent system. The benefits of this
legislative approach include ex ante determination, clarity leading
to certainty and predictability, the ability to hold hearings and
involve a wider swatch of interested parties, and also political
accountability.
Consider, first, that there would be an ex ante determination
of the patentability of controversial technologies. As a result, the
expectations of those who invest in inventive efforts would not be
thwarted. Instead, they would be able to rely upon the patent
system (if patentability were allowed for a particular technology) or
know that the patent system would not reward their efforts (if
patentability were disallowed for a particular technology). This
certainty and predictability, of course, would also depend upon the
clarity of the expression of any exclusions based on moral and
ethical concerns.
Another benefit of the legislative approach compared to the
judicial approach is that Congress presumably would hold hearings
to consider the views of a good number of interested parties rather
than simply the particular parties involved in a lawsuit. In short,
they would be able to weigh the interests of a wider array of people
and groups. Congress and the President, moreover, are politically
accountable to the electorate. Should voters disagree with their
determinations over what moral and ethical concerns rise to the
level of exclusion from the patent system, those voters could take
their concerns to the ballot box.

C. Agency Approach
The remaining approach to consider is having an agency make
decisions regarding moral and ethical concerns over patentability
of technologies. The agency approach-where Congress and the
President would enact a statute that merely delegates the subject
to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office-while better than the
judicial approach, would still be subject to significant problems
given the same considerations considered above with respect to the
judicial and legislative approaches.
Determinations by an agency whether moral and ethical
concerns rise to a level that justifies making patents unavailable
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for certain technologies would be made ex ante-at least compared
to determinations by judges. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
presumably would be granted substantive rulemaking authority
and then use notice and comment rulemaking to develop guidelines
to identify what would cross the line of morality and ethics such
that an applicant would not be eligible for a patent. In this way,
those investing in research and development would know in
advance whether the patent system would be available to support
their investments in the form of rights to exclude users of any
developed technology. In this way, an agency approach would
provide more clarity, certainty, and predictability.
None of the other traditional justifications for delegation to an
agency, however, exist in this context. In particular, agencies do not
have expertise in determining whether the most relevant moral or
ethical considerations (autonomy or valuing human life, for
example) justify prohibiting or not prohibiting the patenting of
certain technologies. These concerns would not present a subject
where scientific or economic expertise would be necessary to make
the best decisions-unlike what level of carbon dioxide emissions
cause damage to the environment or to humans and what business
practices cause harm to competition, where the Environmental
Protection Agency and the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice have important and necessary expertise to accurately
administer regulatory regimes created through legislation.
Agencies, moreover, are politically unaccountable. No one
elects patent examiners, of course, and the leader of the Patent
Office, its Director, is only indirectly accountable to voters given
that he or she is nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate.1 71 Agencies, too, are subject to capture. That is, they may
make decisions consistent with the views of a small, motivated
group of people rather than the views of the general public. 172 This
171 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2020) ("The powers and duties of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office shall be vested in an Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (in this title
referred to as the 'Director'), who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
Director shall be a person who has a professional background and experience in patent
or trademark law.").
172 See Michael A Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and
Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013) ('Capture describes situations where
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political unaccountability theoretically could work either way in
this context-the agency might ban patents on technology about
which most would have no ethical or moral concern, or the agency
might allow patents on technology most would deem morally or
ethically improper. As a practical matter, however, in this context
the more likely scenario is a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
responsive to patent applicants-those seeking patents. The
dynamics of the operation of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
and its relationship with the Federal Circuit as a reviewing court
make it particularly vulnerable to over-patenting. 173 Therefore, in
this context, it seems more likely that the Patent Office would
ignore moral and ethical concerns with particular technologies and
proceed to grant patents regardless of moral and ethical concerns.
In short, an agency approach-while better than a judicial
approach-would not be the best approach to dealing with moral
and ethical concerns related to patentability.
CONCLUSION

Reform proposals in the area of patent eligibility-in
particular to the extent they would overrule the prohibition on
patents encompassing human beings-should bring to the forefront
of our collective consciousness the role of the patent system in
encouraging use of technology some deem immoral or unethical.
Patent law historically allowed judges to address moral and ethical
concerns related to technology. Judges did so by determining on an
ad hoc basis whether inventions were "injurious to the well-being.
.. or sound morals of society" or, in other words, "mischievous or
immoral." 174 While in some ways this historical approach resembles
the modern contract doctrine of public policy, it is not the best
approach. Indeed, given various considerations-certainty and
predictability, clarity, expertise, and accountability chief among
organized interest groups successfully act to vindicate their goals through government
policy at the expense of the public interest. For groups that are repeat players before
specialized agencies, investments in long-term relationships can have substantial
returns in terms of influence, raising capture concerns.").
173 See Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 531 (2011) ("The PTO's
interest in avoiding appeals and reversals, coupled with the Federal Circuit's
asymmetric review of PTO decisions, are themselves enough to generate a surplus of
invalid patents and an inflationary patent law.").
174 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568) (Story, J.).
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them-judges and agencies should not be tasked with determining
which technologies should not be patent eligible based on moral or
ethical concerns. The best approach is to have Congress and the
President address any moral or ethical concerns related to
technology through legislation. And given that patent eligibility
reform is currently a topic in Washington DC, the time to pass any
relevant legislation is now. At a minimum, Congress should
consider readopting as statutory text the Weldon Amendment,
which would require amending 35 U.S.C. § 101 to state that "no
patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human
organism."
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